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1. Introduction 
Recent estimates suggest motor vehicle accidents cost the Australian economy around $17 
billion per year (Connelly and Supangen, 2006). While both the number of crashes and crash 
rates (crashes/kilometre) has reduced dramatically in the last thirty years, latest statistics show 
that 1463 persons were killed on Australian roads in 2008, with 395 killed in the state of New 
South Wales alone (Australian Government, 2009). More worryingly, it appears reductions may 
have stagnated in recent years, leaving policy-makers searching for other options that might lead 
to significant drops in crash rates. While engineering-based methods for both roadway 
infrastructure and vehicles, and regulation and enforcement will continue to play a critical role 
in future road-safety initiatives, an area of growing interest is the use of kilometre-based 
financial mechanisms to encourage safer  driving practices (Litman, 2009). The notion here is 
that by linking what motorists are charged to the kilometres they drive and the circumstances 
under which those kilometres are driven (e.g., night-time driving, route choice, speeding), 
motorists will be directly incentivised to change behaviour, reducing the overall risk and 
societal costs of accidents (Zantema et al. 2008). 
Within this context, the current paper details the development of a kilometre-based rewards 
scheme designed to encourage safer driving practices and reduce the risk of crash involvement. 
The emphasis on rewarding desirable behaviour versus the traditional approach of punishing 
undesirable behaviour is deliberate and rooted in psychological theory showing this to be 
generally a more effective means of influencing behaviour (Mazureck and Van Hatten, 2006). 
Responses to the scheme will be tested both hypothetically through a willingness-to-pay study 
and empirically through a 10-week field study of 140 motorists in Sydney. In the field study, 
motorists are monitored using Global Positioning System (GPS) technology for a five week 
‘before’ period to build up a detailed profile of their regular driving routines and patterns 
(Greaves et al. 2009).This information is used to set a ‘budget’ for each motorist based on their 
kilometres driven, night-time driving and speeding. Motorists are then informed they can make 
money based on the reduction in these measures relative to the before period and monitored for 
a further five weeks. At the end of the trial, they will receive a financial reward based on the 
observed changes - intuition and evidence shows this receipt of a tangible ‘reward’ is crucial for 
motorists to take the study seriously (Mazureck and van Hatten, 2006; Nielsen, 2004). 
This paper is focused on the development of the rewards scheme and is structured as follows. 
The literature review focuses on 1) applications that have designed charging regimes focused on 
crash-risk reduction, and 2) the main factors impacting crash-risk that could be included in a 
charging scheme of the type being considered here. Then the rationale for and structure of the 
rewards system is detailed culminating in the proposed rates that will be charged. The impacts 
of the reward system are then assessed hypothetically using evidence from 125 motorists who 
have completed the ‘before’ study (note that 15 did not qualify for various reasons). Various 
charging scenarios and hypothesised behavioural changes are implemented to assess both the 
incentive for change and the overall financial impact for the project. These results are used in 
conjunction with the theoretical and empirical justification outlined in this paper, to set the final 
charging regime rates based on the overall study budget.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1  Charging regimes focused on crash-risk reduction 
Efforts to financially incentivise safer on-road driving behaviour are most visible through the 
commercial offering of pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) insurance options, in which premiums are 
differentiated to kilometres driven and in some cases time, location and speed (Litman et al. 
2008). Although not widely available in Australia as yet, PAYD schemes are available in 
several states in the U.S. and have been trialled in the UK (through Norwich Union) and the 
Netherlands (Zantema et al. 2008). Commercial sensitivities (presumably) preclude details of 
how rates are set and while some aggregate indicators of the outcomes of the programs are 
provided, rarely is information provided on the before and after changes in driving. One 
exception to this was a recent government-sponsored trial of PAYD insurance in Dallas-Fort 
Worth (Reese and Pash-Brimmer, 2009). Here, motorists were monitored for 12 months 
(divided into two six month periods) before and after the imposition of a distance-based scheme 
that rewarded them at $US25 for each 5% percent reduction in miles driven up to a cap of $350 
($175 per period). The effects of the scheme were to reduce average miles driven by 560 miles 
(5%). Arguably the most ambitious PAYD scheme was the Norwich Union PAYD offering in 
which charges were differentiated by driver demographics, time-of-day, and road type with the 
heaviest charges levied on young drivers (23 and under) at night (Norwich Union, 2006). 
Despite the touted success of the scheme, it was shelved in 2008 because of a lack of uptake 
with only 10,000 people taking up the scheme of a projected 100,000 according to the company 
website. 
Various academic studies have focused on exploring how variable-rate pricing regimes might 
affect motorist behaviour, largely from the perspective of congestion-mitigation with few 
focusing on risk-reduction per se (Nielsen, 2004; Xu, 2009).  The closest parallel to what is 
proposed here is provided by Zantema et al. (2008) through a hypothetical investigation of the 
effects of various PAYD insurance schemes being proposed for young drivers in the 
Netherlands. The approach used is to set a base rate, which in this case is taken as the average 
insurance premium divided by the annual kilometres driven. The base rate is then adjusted 
upwards by factors (derived from various sources) reflective of higher accident risk, including 
driving at night versus driving during the day and driving on urban roads versus motorways. 
They conclude that the most ‘aggressive’ scheme, comprising obligatory time and road type 
differentiation could reduce crashes by over five percent. No published evidence is currently 
available on how this changed behaviour in reality.  
Other studies have looked at specific methods of using financial mechanisms to change 
behaviour, primarily speeding. Mazureck and van Hatten (2006) detail a study in the 
Netherlands, in which motorists were paid to stay within the speed limit and maintain a safe 
following distance. Results indicated that speeding was reduced by around 20 percent based on 
a reward of 0.04 Euros for every 15 seconds spent not speeding – notably, once the rewards 
were removed, drivers largely reverted back to their original behaviour. In a similar study, the 
Swedish Intelligent Economic Speed Adaptation study involved directly linking incentives to 
actual speeding behaviour. In this study participants were paid a lump sum bonus and this bonus 
was reduced by a certain charge for every minute participants drove above the speed limit 
within the study period (Gunnar et al. 2005). 
2.2 Factors impacting crash-risk 
The risk of a crash is influenced by a number of interrelating factors pertaining to the driver, trip 
characteristics, passengers, vehicle, roadway conditions and weather (Drummond et al. 1992). 
Acknowledging this, the intent here is to focus on specific elements of relevance to a GPS-based 
charging regime of the type we are proposing here, namely the kilometres driven, time of day, 
road type, speeding and driver demographics. 
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2.3 Vehicle kilometres 
Logic tells us that each additional kilometre driven increases the chance (all things being equal) 
of an accident, however safe the driver. However, the relationship between the actual number of 
number of kilometres driven and risk is problematic to directly determine because it is not 
information that is directly recorded from involved drivers in the event of an accident. Empirical 
evidence summarised by Litman (2009) in Figure 1 suggests that there is a near linear 
relationship between annual kilometres and crash related claims. However Litman also 
concludes that higher mileage drivers have a lower crash-related claim frequency than lower 
mileage drivers.  Janke (1991) proposes that the relationship between miles driven and traffic 
accidents is nonlinear (i.e., smaller proportional increases in accident rate at higher levels of 
mileage). A recent report from the Californian Department of Motor Vehicles also supports 
these findings, calculating that the accident risk curve dips for drivers reporting higher mileage 
(Gebers 2003). Regardless of the exact slope of the curve, both studies conclude that a driver's 
current level of driving exposure can influence their risk of accident involvement.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Crash rates by annual vehicle mileage (Litman, 2009) 
2.4 Time of day 
Numerous studies have shown the risk of having an accident while driving at night is greater 
than driving within daylight hours, with published studies suggesting the crash risk is 2-3 times 
greater all else being equal (e.g., Doherty et al. 1998; Zantema et al. 2008). OECD figures report 
that although the volume of travel at night is far less than compared to day travel volumes, 35% 
of road accidents occur during night hours (OECD, 1980). This increase in risk is partly due to 
reduced visibility and driver fatigue and the fact that night time driving is more heavily 
associated with risky driving behaviour, such as intoxication and passenger distractions 
(Zantema et al., 2008). 
2.5 Road type 
The safety of certain roads is linked to the road design characteristics such as the speed limit, 
number of lanes, oncoming traffic, intersections, roundabouts and crossings etc. Based on 
accident rates per million kilometres travelled/road type, the consensus appears to be that 
motorways are the safest roads, followed by dual carriageways and single lane roadways 
(Lynam and Lawson, 2005; Zantema et al. 2008). For instance, the Automobile Association 
(AA) Trust Report of British roads (part of the European Road Assessment Program 2006) 
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found that motorways are five times safer than single carriageways and twice as safe as dual 
carriageways (AA Trust Report, 2006).    
2.6 Speeding 
Over the past 50 years considerable research has been undertaken to investigate the relationship 
between speed and crash rates. While the precise nature of this relationship is heavily debated 
and subject to many confounders, the overwhelming consensus is that (all else being equal) a 
linear increase in speed leads to an exponential increase in both the chance of and severity of a 
crash (Elvik et al. 2004; Aarts and Van Schagen, 2005). In their meta-analysis of almost 100 
studies of speeds and accidents, Elvik et al. (2004) conclude that the relationship between speed 
and crash/severity can be described by a Power function as shown (in this case for fatal 
accidents): 
4
Before Speed
After Speed
Before Accidents Fatal
After Accidents Fatal






=  
The implication is (for instance) that lowering speeds from 100 km/h to 90 km/h would result in 
around a 34 percent decrease in fatal accidents. In an Australian context, research conducted by 
Kloeden et al. (2002) in Adelaide suggests the risk of a casualty crash involvement doubles 
every 5km/h for speeds above 60km/h (Figure 2). Despite the differences in the magnitude of 
the risk that is attributed to excess speeds within the literature, it is clear that speed does have an 
influence on risk of being involved in a crash.  
 
 
Figure 2:  Vehicle speed and the risk of involvement in a casualty crash in a 60 km/h zone relative to 
travelling at 60 km/h. 
Note: Interpretation is that at a speed of 70 km/h, the risk is over 10 times that of a casualty crash relative to a speed of 60 km/h 
Source: Kloeden et al. 2002 
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2.7 Driver demographics 
The differences in crash-risk by driver demographics are well documented with in particular 
young drivers having a substantially higher crash rate when compared to most other drivers 
(Doherty et al. 1998; Zantema et al. 2008). In the state of New South Wales young drivers 
(under 26 years of age) hold only 15% of all licences but are annually involved in 36% of all 
road fatalities according to the New South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority, the statutory 
road safety authority (RTA, 2009). Similar figures around the world support the over 
representation of young drivers in motor vehicle accidents. This is particularly pronounced for 
young, male drivers (Ferguson et al. 2007; Gray et al. 2008). Despite the strong focus on young 
male drivers, some studies report that once exposure is taken into account young male and 
female drivers typically have similar crash risks (Ryan et al. 1998; Cavallo and Triggs, 1996). 
This increased risk of young drivers is clearly reflected in driving insurance premiums, which in 
many countries is almost double the premiums for older drivers. 
3. 
The concept behind the proposed rewards system is that motorists receive a financial payment 
based on the relative reduction in correlates of crash-risk (i.e., kilometres driven, night-time 
driving, speeding etc) equated to a per kilometre rate between a 5-week charging period (Period 
2) and a 5-week base period (Period 1). In selecting the correlates (crash-risk groupings) and 
setting the rates, various scientific and pragmatic factors were considered, specifically: 
The rewards system:  Rationale and structure 
1. The crash-risk groupings should capture major factors impacting crash-risk while resulting 
in a scheme that is easy for participants to understand: To accurately facilitate behavioural 
change it is important that the charging regime is transparent and participants fully 
understand how the charges are levied for their trips.   
2. The rates must to be relevant: One of the insightful outcomes of interviews conducted with 
pilot participants is that incentives must be large enough to warrant a change in behaviour 
for a particular circumstance (i.e., relevant for that trip purpose). For example, if a 
participant were to travel 10 km to work and their assigned per km rate was $0.10, the total 
cost for this car trip would be $1.00. This equates to essentially a $1.00 incentive to forgo 
that car trip given the incentive mechanism used in this study (i.e., the difference between 
the budgets for the two study periods). According to pilot feedback this $1.00 incentive 
would not cover the costs of an alternative mode of transport or the inconvenience of having 
to reschedule the work commute.  
3. Payment of the rates must be within the project budget: The hypothetical scenarios 
presented in this paper serve the purpose of providing an estimate of the incentive liability 
required for this study. Unfortunately due to limited resources the charging regime chosen 
will be heavily influenced by the expected incentives that will be required to be paid to 
participants.  
3.1 Development of crash risk groupings 
The decision on crash risk groupings was based on evidence from the literature review, 
computation of crash risks and pragmatism mainly in terms of comprehension of the charging 
regime. Crash risk is simply the number of accidents occurring per some measure of exposure 
(e.g., number of licensed drivers, million kilometres driven) and is computed as follows: 
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ij
ij
ij D
A
R =  (1) 
Where: 
A = annual number of accidents 
D = annual vehicle kilometres travelled 
i = demographic/situational grouping, where situational refers to time-of-day, day-of-week, road 
type, speeding etc 
j = accident type: fatality, injury, property damage only 
 
Crash data were sourced from the Traffic Accident Database System (TADS) year 2002 – 2006, 
an accident database produced by the New South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), the 
statutory road authority for the state. The TADS provides comprehensive details of all accidents 
reported to the police involving one moving road vehicle on a public road in which a person was 
killed or injured or at least one motor vehicle was towed away. Accidents are defined according 
to severity. A fatal accident is an accident in which at least one person dies within 30 days of an 
accident as a result of injuries received in the accident. An injury accident is a non-fatal 
accident in which one person is injured as a result of the accident and who does not die within 
30 days of the accident. Injury accidents are not differentiated by the severity of the injury, but 
at the per person level they are defined in terms of serious injuries, which are those requiring 
hospitalisation and other injuries, which do not require hospitalisation. A Property Damage 
Only (PDO) accident is one in which there is neither a fatality nor injury but which involves at 
least one vehicle being towed away. The implication of these definitions is that the accident 
class takes on the highest order. For instance, an accident with one fatality and 3 injuries would 
be classified as a fatal accident but not appear as an injury accident. 
The exposure data were sourced from the Sydney Household Travel Survey (SHTS). The SHTS 
is a continuous (covers all days of the year) survey of approximately 5,000 households/annum 
from across the Sydney Greater Metropolitan Area that has been running since 1997 (Transport 
Data Centre, 2007). The data can be manipulated to provide weighted VKT estimates by driver 
age and the time-period for passenger vehicles. For this analysis, data from 2001/2002 to 
2005/2006 were pooled (around 25,000 households) and weighted to the 2005 population. 
Based on the computation of crash-risk using the SHTS and TADS data, six demographic 
segments (17-30 male, 17-30 female, 31-65 male, 31-65 female, 66+ male, 66+ female) and two 
time-periods (day = 05:00 – 17:59, night = 20:00 – 04:59) were defined resulting in a total of 24 
demographic/situational categories. Further differentiation by night-time week-end driving was 
also considered, particularly for young drivers, where the crash rates were notably higher, but 
this was not pursued through to the final scheme. The decision not to include road type was 
based on i) practical difficulties with computing the required exposure measures from the SHTS 
because road type was not recorded, and ii) the concern this would result in a scheme that was 
overly complex for participants to comprehend. 
3.2 Derivation of per kilometre rates 
Per kilometre rates were based on the notion that the external costs of accidents be internalised 
across the 24 demographic/situational categories according to their crash risk. Accident costing 
is an inexact science and is an ongoing area of research and development (Risbey et al. 2007). It 
is mainly dependent on the particular costing approach used, crash cost components, and quality 
and quantity of available data. The current approach for estimating the cost of crashes in New 
South Wales (as with the rest of Australia) is based on the human capital (HC) approach 
stipulated by Austroads, which is the association of Australian and New Zealand road transport 
and traffic authorities (Austroads, 2003). Under this approach, dollar costs are assigned to the 
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various components of crashes, specifically the human (e.g., medical costs, ambulance costs, 
loss of earnings), vehicle (e.g., repairs, towing) and general costs (e.g., travel delays, police 
costs). The approach has come under heavy criticism, primarily because evidence from the UK, 
USA, New Zealand, and Sweden suggests it undervalues the price individuals place on reducing 
their crash risk while driving (Hensher et al. 2009). Recent evidence from Sydney, in which 
motorists were asked to trade-off crash-risk against travel time and out-of-pocket costs using 
innovative Stated Choice (SC) methods, strengthens this claim (Hensher et al. 2009). Table 1 
provides a comparison of this (so-called) value of risk reduction (VRR) approach versus the HC 
approach, suggesting that fatalities in particular may be under-valued by around four times 
using the HC approach. The story with injuries is not as clear, which even allowing for some 
definitional issues suggest that serious injuries in particular may be over-valued using the HC 
approach (or under-valued using the value of crash risk approach). 
Table 1:  Casualty costs per person using the human capital and value of crash risk reduction 
approach in New South Wales (2007) 
Human Capital Approach (1) Value of Risk Reduction Approach (2) 
Fatal Injury $1,605,737 Fatal Injury $6,369,655 
Serious Injury – S (requires 
hospitalisation) 
$ 400,094 
 
Serious Injury – S (requires 
hospitalisation, results in 
permanent disability) 
$310,292 
Hospital Injury - H (requires 
hospitalisation but full 
recovery) 
$75,476 
Minor Injury – M $16,264 Minor Injury - M $16,552 
Total Injuries (S+M) $108,395 Total Injuries (S+H+M) $44,793 
(1) Modified from RTA Economic Analysis Manual, Version 2, (1999), table 11, page B-9 to 2007 using the 
inflation rate provided by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA, 2009) at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/calc.go#divFrmCalcQ 
(2) Adapted from Hensher et al. (2009) 
 
Given the dual desires of basing the rates on risk, but also developing rates that encourage 
behavioural change, it was decided to use the higher (highlighted) figures from the two 
approaches for fatalities and injuries. This also required conversion of the per person casualty 
costs to a per crash casualty cost – this was computed from the TADS data as being 1.19 
fatalities/fatality accident and 1.30 injuries/injury accident. A further issue here was PDO 
accidents, for which cost estimates are derived separately based on insurance claims data by the 
Bureau of Transport Economics (Bureau of Transport Economics, 2000). Final details of the 
estimated crash costs together with the annual accidents and total annual accident costs are 
shown in Table 2. A further issue with PDO accidents is that they only appear in the TADS 
database if at least one vehicle requires towing. Given that (according to the BTE report), only 
21 percent of vehicles involved in a crash require towing, PDO accidents from the TADS 
database were factored by 1.79 to account for this under-reporting. It should be noted this will 
still tend to under-estimate the number of PDO crashes, because the BTE only considers those 
crashes that involve an insurance claim.  
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Table 2:  Crash costs for the study period 
Accident Type Annual Accidents(1) Cost/Accident (AUD$) Annual Accident Costs 
 Total Accidents Total Vehicles Involved   
Fatal Injury 228 250 $7,553,194 $1,722,128,165 
Injury 14,961 21,221 $140,870 $2,107,556,070 
Property 
Damage Only 100,899
(2) 154,783 $7,954(3) $802,554,766 
TOTAL 116,088 176,254  $4,632,239,001 
(1) Computed as the average number of accidents/year over the five-year TADS data used. 
(2) Adjusted to account for non-towaway accidents. 
(3) Based on BTE (2000) rates factored to 2007. 
 
Having established the total cost of accidents for each accident type Lj the next step was how to 
internalise/assign this cost across the 24 categories. The approach taken was to establish a base 
charging rate χB 
( ) ( ) ( ) jBjjBjjBjj LVKTVKTVKT =××++××+×× χβχβχβ 28282211 ...
, representing the per kilometre charge for the lowest risk category, with rates 
for other categories set dependent on the relative crash risk (β) to this base category. Given the 
requirements for costs to be based on a per kilometre basis, β needed to be weighted by the 
relevant VKT for that category such that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) jjjjBj LVKTVKTVKT =×+×+× 28282211 ... βββχ  
( ) j
ij
ijiBj LVKT =×∑ βχ  (2) 
LL
j
j =∑   (3) 
Where: 
i = demographic/situational category 
j = accident type: fatality, injury, property damage only 
VKTi is the vehicle kilometre travel of category i  
β ij is the relative risk for category i and accident type j 
χBj is the base charging price of accident type j 
Lj
The initial per kilometre charges are shown in 
 is the total accident cost of accident type j 
L is the total accident cost 
 
Table 3, together with an indication of how these 
were derived. The group with the lowest crash rates/risk were 31-65 year-old males driving 
during the day with a base charging rate of 7.7 cents/kilometre (highlighted in grey). Charges 
for other groups were then set based on the relative risk of each particular category to this base 
category, such that the total accident costs shown in Table 2 were maintained. Per kilometre 
charges ranged from 7.7 cents to 69.7 cents for the highest risk group, 17-30 year-old males 
driving at night, largely due to around a 16 times greater relative fatality risk. It should be noted 
that the (perhaps surprisingly) high figure of 66.2 cents for elderly (66+) female drivers at night 
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is misleading, because of the very low sample representation in the exposure database for this 
particular group – in this case, it was decided to simply use the figure for elderly males. 
Table 3:  Derivation of per kilometre rates for the 12 charging groups 
 
 
3.3 Speeding 
Speeding was dealt with as a simple multiplier on the base rates, similar to the approach 
proposed by Zantema et al. (2008). The main issues were the tolerance given and speeding 
bands. In terms of tolerance, current New South Wales as of July 1st
The initial per kilometre rates are shown in 
, 2009 law is zero tolerance 
and is based on radar and camera enforcement. As a result speeding was defined as anything 
over the speed limit irrespective of the time spent speeding, which is deliberately more stringent 
than similar studies (e.g. Mazureck and van Hattern, 2006; Agerholm, 2009). In terms of bands, 
initially speeding was differentiated into two categories, minor speeding (1-10 km/h over) and 
major speeding (>10 km/h). However, following considerable debate and some confusion by 
pilot participants, this was simply differentiated as speeding (>=1 km/h above the posted speed 
limit) and a multiplier of double the base rate was applied. 
Table 4. Young males (the highest risk group) 
would be charged the highest per kilometre rates ranging from $0.25 per kilometre, for driving 
within the speed limit during the day, to as high as $1.40 per kilometre for driving above the 
speed limit during the night. Middle aged females would be charged the lowest per kilometre 
rates ranging from $0.20 per kilometre (day, non-speeding) to $0.40 cents per kilometre (night, 
speeding). 
Table 4:  Initial per kilometre rates 
Demographic 
Group 
Day (0:500 – 20:00) Night (20:00 – 05:00) 
Non Speeding Speeding Non Speeding Speeding 
17-30 Male $0.25 $0.50 $0.70 $1.40 
17-30 Female $0.20 $0.40 $0.40 $0.80 
31-65 Male $0.10 $0.20 $0.20 $0.40 
31-65 Female $0.10 $0.20 $0.15 $0.30 
66+ Male $0.20 $0.40 $0.25 $0.50 
66+ Female* $0.20 $0.40 $0.25 $0.50 
*Due to very small sample size in the SHTS data use the same figure for 66+ males. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fatal Injury PDO
Total 
VKT Fatal Injury PDO Fatal Injury PDO Fatal Injury PDO
All 
Crashes
5-20 43        3,793   33,540   3,832      0.011 0.990 8.753 3.03 2.63 3.18 7.8 9.8 4.5 22.2
20-5 36        1,140   10,126   598         0.061 1.904 16.920 16.30 5.05 6.15 42.0 18.9 8.8 69.7
5-20 55        5,516   40,240   14,629    0.004 0.377 2.751 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.6 3.7 1.4 7.7
20-5 22        780      5,975     1,426      0.015 0.547 4.189 4.06 1.45 1.52 10.4 5.4 2.2 18.0
5-20 19        876      5,950     1,477      0.013 0.593 4.030 3.48 1.57 1.47 9.0 5.9 2.1 17.0
20-5 1          52        325        71           0.020 0.729 4.569 5.28 1.93 1.66 13.6 7.2 2.4 23.2
5-20 16        3,143   21,061   2,685      0.006 1.171 7.843 1.64 3.10 2.85 4.2 11.6 4.1 19.9
20-5 10        528      3,624     360         0.028 1.466 10.063 7.44 3.89 3.66 19.2 14.6 5.2 38.9
5-20 33        4,600   28,707   9,702      0.003 0.474 2.959 0.92 1.26 1.08 2.4 4.7 1.5 8.6
20-5 6          340      2,250     674         0.009 0.504 3.340 2.47 1.34 1.21 6.3 5.0 1.7 13.1
5-20 7          432      2,881     625         0.011 0.692 4.610 2.92 1.83 1.68 7.5 6.9 2.4 16.8
20-5 1          22        104        10           0.058 2.134 9.981 15.46 5.66 3.63 39.8 21.2 5.2 66.2
Time of 
DayGender
17-30
Crash Involvements per Year Crash Rates Relative Risk Cents/km
31-65
31-65
65+
Male
17-30
Female
Age
65+
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4. 
The purpose of the scenario testing was to assess and refine the rewards scheme to both 
maximise the motivation for behavioural change while staying within the confines of the project 
budget for incentives, which was approximately $AU10,000. This involved taking the 125 
drivers who qualified for the rewards phase of the project and computing a ‘budget’ for them 
based on their VKT, night-time driving and speeding combined with the applicable rates over 
the five-week before period. This budget represents the maximum amount of money they could 
make by changing behaviour, which equates to not driving their vehicle at all for the five-week 
after period. Drivers were recruited from an online panel, which enabled targeted recruitment 
based on age and gender. They were told the study was about transport planning in Sydney and 
asked to take a GPS device for the duration of the study. Nothing was mentioned about the 
rewards phase because of the potential for affecting their driving in the before phase. 
Scenario testing 
The original aim was to only recruit drivers under the age of 65 with roughly equal numbers in 
the four demographic categories. It became clear after several weeks of trying that this was not 
going to be possible and it proved particularly problematic to recruit young drivers, especially 
males, while comparatively easy to recruit older females. Table 5 shows the final breakdown of 
the sample along with their driving characteristics and starting budget. Average VKT was 
highest for the older male group while night-time driving peaked for the young male groups, 
both in line (arguably) with a priori expectations. Speeding was reasonably consistent across the 
groups, peaking for the young, female drivers. Contrary (perhaps) to current expectations, 
young male drivers did not exhibit higher speeding tendencies than the other demographic 
groups. This may be down to the self-selection bias introduced through the sampling process, 
which suggests that young males exhibiting more risky behaviour are less inclined to participate 
in a driving study of this nature, an observation that seems to hold true across similar studies 
(Agerholm, 2009). 
Table 5:  Driving characteristics and starting budget for motorists in the study 
Age-
Group 
Sample Average 
Daily 
VKT 
% 
Night 
VKT 
% Speeding 
(Day) 
% Speeding (Night) Starting Budget (based 
on 5 weeks) 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Range 
17-30 
Male 9 24.7 26% 11% 17% 12% 44% $343 $86-$635 
17-30 
Female 23 28.4 16% 14% 34% 16% 50% $288 $88-$564 
31-65 
Male 47 32.2 12% 13% 44% 13% 45% $160 $14-$440 
31-65 
Female 46 26.7 7% 12% 26% 12% 39% $123 $15-$362 
TOTAL 125 29.0 12% 13% 44% 13% 50% $183 $14-$635 
*Maximum budgetary impacts - $22,043 
Projected incentives payable were then computed by conducting a sensitivity analysis according 
to assumed rates of change to VKT, night-time driving and speeding over the five-week ‘after’ 
period (shown in Table 6). The basis for these assumptions was evidence collected from a 
number of voluntary travel behaviour change interventions conducted in Australia and in-depth 
interviews conducted with pilot participants for this project. Under the most conservative 
scenario (Scenario 1), the projected incentives ranged from $8 for 31-65 year-old females to $32 
for 17-30 year-old males, with a projected payout of $1,695. Under the most aggressive scenario 
(Scenario 4), the average incentives ranged from $22 to $87 across the four groups with a 
projected payout of $4,658. 
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Table 6:  Projected incentives under various scenarios (initial per kilometre rates) 
 Starting Budget Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
% reduction - VKT 5% 8% 12% 15% 
% reduction – night driving 10% 15% 15% 20% 
% reduction - speeding 15% 25% 35% 45% 
17-30 Males Average $343 $32 $50 $69 $87 
Range $86-$635 $8-$58 $12-$93 $17-$129 $21-$161 
17-30 Females Average $288 $23 $36 $50 $62 
Range $88-$564 $5-$47 $9-$74 $13-$102 $16-$127 
31-65 Males Average $154 $12 $19 $27 $33 
Range $14-$353 $1-$37 $2-$58 $3-$77 $3-$97 
31-65 Females Average $130 $8 $13 $18 $22 
Range $15-$440 $1-$25 $1-$39 $2-$53 $2-$66 
Projected Incentive Payout $22,043 $1,695 $2,676 $3,727 $4,658 
 
The various scenarios in Table 6 suggested that the initial rates would be unlikely to motivate 
the majority of participants to change their driving behaviour. A number of other rate structures 
were tried and tested before establishing the final scheme shown in Table 7. The final rates were 
chosen to provide more encouragement to change behaviour while at the same time maintaining 
the relative risk cost framework outlined in this paper. Upon careful consideration it was 
decided that the rates would differentiate based on age and not gender. This was due to the small 
sample sizes of the four demographic groups and proposed analysis requirements.  
Table 7:  Final rates used for the rewards phase and budgetary implications 
 
Day - Non 
Speeding Day - Speeding 
Night - Non 
Speeding Night - Speeding 
17-30 Male $0.20 $0.60 $0.80 $2.40 
17-30 Female $0.20 $0.60 $0.80 $2.40 
31-65 Male $0.15 $0.45 $0.60 $1.20 
31-65 Female $0.15 $0.45 $0.60 $1.20 
 
Sensitivity analysis was also performed using the new rates (outlined in Table 7) according to 
the same rates of change to VKT, night-time driving and speeding as before (Table 8). The 
average incentive ranges from $21 for Females 26-65 years of age to $119 for Females 17-25 
years of age, depending on the behavioural response scenario. Again, it must be emphasised this 
is based on hypothesised behavioural changes – in actuality payouts to individuals could be 
much larger as shown by the starting budgets. 
Table 8:  Projected incentives under various scenarios (final per kilometre rates) 
 Starting Budget Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
% reduction - VKT 5% 8% 12% 15% 
% reduction – night driving 10% 15% 15% 20% 
% reduction - speeding 15% 25% 35% 45% 
18-30 Males Average $352 $41 $64 $87 $108 
Range $83-$627 $9-$84 $14-$131 $19-$171 $24-$210 
18-30 Females Average $403 $45 $71 $96 $119 
Range $105-$815 $6-$111 $9-$175 $13-$234 $17-$290 
31-65 Males Average $315 $32 $50 $68 $85 
Range $29-$911 $3-$116 $5-$182 $7-$241 $9-$301 
31-65 Females Average $233 $21 $33 $45 $56 
Range $23-$654 $1-$56 $2-$87 $3-$116 $4-$145 
Projected Incentive Payout $36,335 $3,708 $5,831 $7,895 $9,855 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper details the development of a kilometre-based rewards regime designed to encourage 
safer driving practices. Clearly, while a number of scientific and pragmatic factors must be 
taken into account when designing such a scheme, the primary issue is whether it is sufficient to 
motivate behavioural change. Initially, a scheme developed based on crash risk and costs was 
developed and while this provided a substantial impetus for a small number of high-risk drivers, 
the majority had little incentive to change. Following a number of trials, a scheme was 
developed that presented the majority of participants with a budget deemed sufficient to 
motivate change (around $300) without putting the project budget at undue risk. Of course, it 
remains to be seen how participants respond to the regime and whether in fact they are able to 
make meaningful changes, something which will be known early in 2010 following completion 
of the field trial of the regime. 
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